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Consultant

August 7, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: S - C. D. Jackson

SUBJECT: General Assembly Strategy

Although Scotty Reston would probably not agree, the Khrushchev reply represents a signal victory for our side and in no way diminishes the opportunity which we sensed last week for seizing and holding a powerful initiative.

While the General Assembly is not the Security Council, nevertheless the General Assembly is The World and not just eleven nations. I hope, therefore, that you will consider the shift to the General Assembly as calling only for a change in the tactics of procedure and not for a change in the strategy of opportunity.

As of the moment I can see three ways in which we might proceed.

1. Assume with a sigh of relief that we are now back within the familiar framework of General Assembly routine and act accordingly.
2. Assume that although we are back in the General Assembly, there is special quality to this meeting which gives us a number of opportunities to introduce a wide variety of forceful and imaginative resolutions which would result in a large number of U.N. subcommittees and study groups being appointed. However their impact would be restricted and would yield only dispersed and long delayed action without clarifying our position, our hopes or desires, without hitting the man on the street or the millions who cannot read newspapers.
3. Assume that the long series of events which are reaching their climax in this special meeting of the General Assembly present us with the kind of opportunity we have not had in a long, long time to speak almost directly to hundreds of millions of people

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and by using the current sharp interest in the Middle East to identify ourselves unmistakably to the whole world with the legitimate aspirations of nationalism and the vast benefits which can accrue to individual human beings through the orderly development of nationalism dynamically assisted by the United States and its allies.

Now, suddenly, what began as a Moscow counterattack to our sending troops into Lebanon has turned into our occasion where the initiative is in our grasp. The setting is no longer the great powers alone nor even the Security Council. It is the Town Meeting of the World with the nations of the underdeveloped areas heavily represented.

The Assembly meeting is a priceless opportunity to reassert our effective leadership in the Free World as a whole by making clear that our stance toward the nationalist revolution in the Middle East can apply as well to Asia, Africa and Latin America.

And this opportunity to generalize our position is wholly legitimate because the three basic elements in the Middle East problem are also the essence of the Afro-Asian problem and to a certain extent the Latin American problem; that is, blocking Communist tactics of disruption, deflating the disruptive dimensions of nationalist fervor, thus clearing the ground for the constructive expression of nationalism.

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In order adequately to capitalize on this opportunity within this context, the President should appear at the General Assembly.

How would he do this? What would he say? How can he say enough to achieve the impact required without getting trapped into positions which the shortness of time does not permit to have adequately staffed, coordinated and agreed.

I believe that a speech can be drafted which will pack the necessary wallop without having every t crossed and i dotted.

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So far as the Middle East is concerned, the image of American purposes and American intent must be clarified and projected with a force that reaches down to the last bedouin, the last impassioned Arab egghead. They must be made to see clearly three things:

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1. The U.S. is not going to be bluffed into impotence in the Middle East by threats of Soviet missiles and "volunteers". The Middle East remains an area where on essential matters of security, the U.S. is an active great power and intends to remain so. The President could project this theme in a simple, forceful affirmation of our case for going into Lebanon.

2. The U.S. is capable of generating effective measures -- hopefully through the U.N., if not outside -- to frustrate Nasser's vision of a personal Arab empire. The President could project this theme by presenting briefly the case for the specific U.N. resolutions which you may wish to put forward covering Jordan, propaganda, arms control, etc.

3. The U.S. is prepared actively to commit itself to aid the Arab world in moving toward a better life for the men, women and children who live within it.

So far as the President's statement on the Middle East is concerned, on the basis of what I have learned since you left for Rio I consider it imperative that this should be the dominant theme. I am aware it poses difficulties (although fewer than a concentration on indirect aggression); and here is how they look to me.

* * *

On the one hand. It is essential for the effectiveness of the American position before the General Assembly that we make a bona fide offer of enlarged resources for Arab economic development on a regional basis. In the short run, we must do this to persuade Arabs that in certain major directions we are the friends of Arab nationalism -- including its regional grouping; and to make politically palatable to the General Assembly the whole American package, by offering a strong constructive proposal as well as essential negative proposals. In the long run, we must do this to afford a framework within which Arab nationalism may develop on a regional basis around constructive objectives rather than those which Nasser is currently pursuing.

On the other hand. The offer we make must face and meet two hard considerations. First, it would be disastrous if such funds were made available on terms which permitted their diversion to military or quasi-military purposes, propaganda, etc: the machinery we propose must guarantee that the funds flow for productive projects only. Second, there is no time before the Assembly to negotiate understandings -- national and international -- on the sources of capital.

Under these circumstances it is evident that the United States cannot make a definitive offer in terms of scale at the Assembly session. We can dramatize the issue of Arab poverty, disease, and illiteracy; hold up a

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vision of what might be accomplished with a whole-hearted effort in partnership; commit ourselves in quite specific ways to help erect cooperative regional machinery for economic development (linked to the I.B.R.D.); and commit ourselves to explore new sources of capital.

A crucial issue, nevertheless, remains: how shall we state the terms on which resources will be made available to a regional development fund?

Essentially there are two ways of doing this. The first would be to make the achievement of political stability in the Middle East a pre-requisite for the release of funds. The second would be to make these funds available, in principle, for projects which meet, say, DLF standards.

The first statement of terms has the advantage of not appearing to reward naughty boys and the advantage of stating candidly what our ultimate objective, in fact, is -- namely, orderly political development. There are, however, these disadvantages. Political stability is almost impossible to define precisely in the setting of Near East politics; and, moreover, we must count on a good deal of continuing political disorder of one kind or another. To ask for political stability as a prior condition may appear to Arabs and to the General Assembly as a whole, to be in effect, making an empty offer. Further it may appear -- and be taken -- as condescending to tell sovereign states that they must become good boys before they can get any goodies. (Actually, young nationalist states are quite a lot like naughty boys; but the best method for getting them to pack up their switch-blade knives is to make it attractive for them to play basketball at the boys club -- rather than to make them reform before you let them in the door -- since we don't quite have the capacity to send Nasser to reform school.)

The second statement of terms -- productive projects -- has these advantages. It is clear; it is understandable to the Arab Governments and to the Assembly as a whole; and it has the sanction of international practice, at the IBED, DLF, etc. Further, it offers an immediate incentive for the small influential group in the Arab World, concerned with economic development, to bring pressure on their governments to qualify for loans. It takes a lot of political energy and staff work to prepare productive projects in an under-developed country. And it takes time. If anything approximating political stability emerges in the Middle East it will not be because Nasser decides suddenly to reform and to create political stability. Political stability will only emerge as a living process as the narrow elite of the Arab world gets progressively more caught up in the constructive tasks of modernizing their societies as opposed to raising hell beyond their borders. Thus the second criterion is not only likely to make the American offer more effective in the short run but also to contribute in a realistic way towards the process of gradual political stabilization.

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We need, in short, an immediately operational carrot as well as an immediately operational stick.

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Having built up to the economic development offer for the Middle East the President should then move on to a general statement of our stance towards the nationalist revolutions throughout the world, climaxing this portion of his text with a proposal to the General Assembly to proclaim 1959 the International Development Year: a period for stock-taking, re-examination of policies, effort at scientific breakthroughs to aid development, improved international coordination of development efforts, etc. I believe the idea of an International Development Year will not only prove popular but its acceptance may also be essential if we are to generate in the United States the political setting to do the things we must try to do at the next session of Congress.

Thanks to the real success of the International Geophysical Year the name, International Development Year, will have immediate sex appeal domestically and internationally.

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In general, then, the voice of the President is necessary if we are to achieve our basic purpose which is to make Arabs -- and peoples everywhere -- begin to think differently about the limits and the possibilities of their future.

The total strategy requires, of course, that we also initiate a number of U.N. resolutions including the resolution on the big vista of development. Actually the combination of the familiar resolution routine and the drama of the President's alternation of stern resolve and glowing opportunity would furnish the maximum dramatic effect.

Without pretending that the following is a complete or an appropriate list or going into any one of them in any detail, here are some items which came to mind as subjects for U.N. resolutions:

a. We should find a formula (if Cabot assures us we can get it accepted in the Assembly) which would limit, if not halt the flow of Soviet arms into the Arab world and, needless to say, do so without bringing the Baghdad Pact into jeopardy. Conceivably this would start with a U.N. study of the flow of arms into the Middle East leading to recommendations for a moratorium to be monitored by a Middle East arms commission.

b. We can urge an enlarged stand-by U.N. force that would at least present serious obstacles to continued indirect aggression and put a good bit of sand in Nasser's gears.

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c. We can urge U.N. condemnation of inflammatory propaganda; U.N. continued monitoring of radio broadcasts in the Middle East; U.N. monthly reporting on propaganda conditions -- again, if we can get it restricted to that narrow area.

d. We can urge a U.N. guarantee of the independence and integrity of Lebanon -- if the Lebanese want it.

e. Jordan ???!! We might find a way of buying some more time and/or finding a formula for British withdrawal that does not in itself become the trigger mechanism for fresh conflict in the area. (If I were working for Moscow, instead of Washington, I would see to it that Hussein was assassinated 36 hours after the General Assembly convenes. Conceivably, Mr. K. is just as evil-minded as I am, and if so, we had better have those ducks in a row in concert with the British. Those paratroopers must know what to do if an Iraq-type revolution takes place in Jordan while they are still there.)

f. We can and must, above all, develop a ringing resolution which conveys a concrete image of the potentials of Arab economic development and sets in motion immediately specific regional measures to accelerate that development.

Quite aside from the intrinsic case for it, such a move of substance is required in my judgment if the other resolutions are to be held together and carried in the Assembly as a package.

* * *

Now, finally, how might the President's speech unfold?

He should begin with Lebanon and reaffirm our position; namely that we are prepared to consider requests of assistance from sovereign states which have good reason to feel their political life violated and intruded upon by outside powers. This is, of course, one basic mission of the U.N.; but the United States cannot rule out the possibility of acting bilaterally if necessary. On the other hand, the U.S. is not committed to defend the status quo. It is committed to help defend the right of peoples to determine the pattern of change within their own borders; and in Lebanon we look to the earliest possible withdrawal.

Then on the principle that the change must be brought about by means which respect the right of peoples to determine their own destiny, the President should move on to indicate briefly our positions, such as they may finally be, on Jordan, arms control, propaganda, etc.

The President could then state that all that proceeded is designed to permit the Arabs, in partnership with those who would help them, to

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concentrate on the primary mission of Arab nationalism; that is to elevate the dignity and level of life for the men, women and children who live in the Arab world. Here the Middle East development offer and a constructive vista of an Arab renaissance.

The President would then generalize our position to Asia, Africa, and Latin America climaxing this portion of the text with the proposal for the International Development Year.

The peroration should be pitched to the problem of peace and effective international arms control, harking back to the President's last appearance before the General Assembly in December 1953. The punch line should be a plea to the Russian peoples to recognize that the emerging world of new nations is not going to be dominated by any one power or power grouping; and that the Russian leaders should recognize this great historical fact and concentrate on helping to build a framework of peace and order within which all nations and peoples might securely devote themselves to human betterment.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Dear Albee,
Attached is
copy of memo which
was waiting for
the Secretary on
his arrival.

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